Moore(anists) and Wittgenstein on Radical Skepticism
Keywords:
hinges, knowledge, radical skepticism, Moore G. E., Wittgenstein LudwigAbstract
In this paper, I present and criticize a number of influential contemporary anti-skeptical strategies inspired by G.E. Moore’s “proof of an external world”. I argue that these accounts cannot represent a valid response to skeptical worries. Furthermore, drawing on Wittgenstein’s criticisms of Moore, I argue that Radical skeptical hypotheses should be considered nonsensical combinations of signs, excluded from our epistemic practices.
References
Avnur Y., 2011. “An Old Problem for New Rationalism”, Synthèse 183 (2), pp. 175-185.
Coliva, A., 2015. Extended Rationality. A Hinge Epistemology. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Coliva, A. 2010. Moore and Wittgenstein. Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Coliva, A., 2009 a, “Moore’s Proof and Martin Davies’ epistemic projects”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88, pp. 101-116.
Coliva, A., 2009 b. “Moore’s Proof, liberals and conservatives. Is there a third way?” in A. Coliva (ed.) Mind, Meaning and Knowledge. Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Conant, J., 1998. “Wittgenstein on Meaning and Use”, Philosophical Investigations 21, pp. 222-250.
Davies, M., 2003a. “Armchair Knowledge, Begging the Question, and Epistemic Warrant”. Carl G. Hempel Lectures, Princeton University, Sept. 22-26, 2003.
Davies, M., 2003b. “The Problem of Armchair Knowledge”. In: Nuccetelli, Susana (ed), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
Davies, M., 2004. “Epistemic Entitlement, Warrant Transmission, and Easy Knowledge” Aristotelian Society Supplement 78: pp. 213-241.
Fara, M., 2008. “How Moore Beat the Skeptic”, draft.
Greco, J., 2002. “How to Reid Moore”, The Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209): pp. 544-563.
Jenkins, C., 2007. “Entitlement and Rationality”, Synthese 157, pp. 25-45.
Hacker P.M.S. and Baker, G.P, 1985. Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar, and Necessity, Volume 2 of Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations. Oxford, UK and Cambridge, Mass. USA: Blackwell.
Hawthorne, J., 2005. “The Case for Closure”, in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, M. Steup and E. Sosa (eds.). Boston: Blackwell, pp. 26-42.
Moore, G. E., 1925. “A Defense of Common Sense”. In: Contemporary British Philosophers, 1925, reprinted in G. E. Moore (1962), Philosophical Papers, London: Collier Books.
Moore, G. E., 1939. “Proof of an External World”, Proceedings of the British Academy, reprinted in (1962), Philosophical Papers, London: Collier Books.
Moyal-Sharrock, D. and Brenner, W.H., 2005. Readings of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Moyal-Sharrock, D., 2004. Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
McGinn, M., 1989. Sense and Certainty: A Dissolution of Scepticism, Oxford: Blackwell.
Morawetz, T., 1978. Wittgenstein & Knowledge: The Importance of On Certainty, Cambridge, MA: Harvester Press.
Neta, R., 2007. “Fixing the Transmission: the New Mooreans”. In: Themes from G.E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics, ed. by Nuccetelli and Seay, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Newman, J.H., 1844. Sermons, Chiefly on the Theory of Religious Belief, Preached before the University of Oxford, London: J.G. F & J. Rivington. https://archive.org/details/theorybelief01newmuoft (Accessed Nov. 15, 2016).
Newman, J.H., 1985 (1870). An essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, ed. I.T. Kerr, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nozick, R., 1981. Philosophical Explanations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pedersen, N., 2009. “Entitlement, Value and Rationality”, Synthèse 171 (3) 443-457.
Pritchard, D. H. (forthcoming). “Wittgenstein on Hinges and Radical Scepticism in On Certainty”, Blackwell Companion to Wittgenstein, H.J. Glock & J. Hyman (eds.), London: Blackwell. Preprint draft https://www.academia.edu/19857886/Wittgenstein_On_Hinge_Commitments_and_Radical_Scepticism_in_On_Certainty (Accessed Nov. 15, 2016).
Pritchard, D. H., 2014. “Entitlement and the Groundlessness of Our Believing”, in Contemporary Perspectives on Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, D. Dodd & E. Zardini (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pritchard, D. H., 2013. “Wittgensteinian Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Vertigo” (with C. Boult), Philosophia 41, pp. 27-35.
Pritchard, D. H., 2005. “Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and Contemporary Anti-skepticism”. In: Readings of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, D. Moyal-Sharrock and W.H. Brenner (eds.). London: Palgrave, pp. 189-224.
Pritchard, D. H., 2002. “Resurrecting the Moorean Response to the Sceptic”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10, pp. 283-307.
Pritchard, D., 2001. “Radical Scepticism, Epistemological Externalism, and ‘Hinge’ Propositions”. In: Wittgenstein-Jahrbuch (2001/2002), Lütterfelds, Roser, Raatzsch (eds.). Frankfurt: Peter Lang.
Pritchard, D. H., 2000. “Is ‘God Exists’ a ‘Hinge’ Proposition of Religious Belief?”, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 47, pp. 129-40.
Putnam, H. (1981), Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pryor, J., 2000. “The Skeptic and The Dogmatist”, Noûs 34, pp. 517-49.
Pryor, J., 2004. “What’s Wrong with Moore’s Argument?” Philosophical Issues, 14.
Pryor, J., 2012. “When Warrant Transmits”. In: Wittgenstein, Epistemology and Mind: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, Annalisa Coliva (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Salvatore, N.C., 2013. “Skepticism, Rules and Grammar’, Polish Journal of Philosophy VII (1), pp. 31-53.
Salvatore, N.C., 2015. “Wittgensteinian Epistemology and Cartesian Skepticism”, Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy 29 (2), pp. 53-80.
Salvatore, N.C., 2016. ‘Wittgenstein: Epistemology’, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/witt-epi/
Salvatore, N.C. (forthcoming), “Skepticism and Nonsense”, Southwest Philosophical Studies 38.
Sosa, E., 1999. “How to Defeat Opposition to Moore.” Philosophical Perspectives 13, pp. 141–154.
Sosa, E., 2000. “Skepticism and Contextualism”, Philosophical Issues 10, pp. 1–18.
Stroll, A., 1994. Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sorensen, R., 2013. “Vagueness”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Winter 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/vagueness/
Weber, Z. and Colyvan, M., 2010. “A Topological Sorites”, The Journal of Philosophy 107, pp. 311–325.
Williamson, T., 2000. Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williams, M., 2004a. “Wittgenstein’s Refutation of Idealism”. In: Wittgenstein and Skepticism, D. McManus (ed.), London, New York: Routledge, pp. 76-96.
Williams, M., 2004b. “Wittgenstein, Truth and Certainty”. In: Wittgenstein’s Lasting Significance, M. Kolbel, B. Weiss (eds.), London: Routledge.
Williams, M., 2005. “Why Wittgenstein Isn’t a Foundationalist”. In: Readings of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, D. Moyal-Sharrock and W.H. Brenner (eds.), 47-58.
Wittgenstein, L., 2009. Philosophical Investigations, revised 4th ed., edited by P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, tr. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L., 1979. Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge 1932–35, from the Notes of Alice Ambrose and Margaret MacDonald, ed. Alice Ambrose, Oxford: Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L., 1974. Philosophical Grammar, ed. R. Rhees, tr. A. J. P. Kenny. Oxford: Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L., 1969. On Certainty, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, tr. D. Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell.
Wright, C., 1985. “Facts and Certainty”, Proceedings of the British Academy 71, pp. 429-72.
Wright, C., 2004a. “Warrant for nothing (and foundation for free)?”, Aristotelian Society Supplement, 78 (1), pp. 167-212.
Wright, C., 2004b. “Wittgensteinian Certainties”. In: Wittgenstein and Skepticism, D. McManus (ed.). London and New York: Routledge, pp. 22-55.
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
NWR uses the Creative Commons license CC-BY.
Vol. 1-3 used CC-BY-NC-SA. The collected works copyright ownership for Vol. 1-2 were shared by Nordic Wittgenstein Society and ontos Verlag/De Gruyter.
