Remarks on Perception and Other Minds
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15845/nwr.v6i2.3403Keywords:
Mindreading, Other Minds, Perception, Seeing, Wittgenstein LudwigAbstract
It is a simple truth about the English language that we can see or hear or feel what others are thinking or feeling. But it is tempting to think that there is a deeper sense in which we cannot really see or hear or feel these things at all. Rather, what is involved must be a matter of inference or interpretation, for instance. In these remarks, I argue against a variety of ways in which that thought, the thought that we cannot really see or hear or feel what others are thinking or feeling, might be developed.
References
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