Aspect-Perception as a Philosophical Method

Authors

  • Reshef Agam-Segal Virginia Military Institute

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15845/nwr.v4i1.3252

Keywords:

metaphilosophy, aspect seeing, Wittgenstein Ludwig, philosophical method

Abstract

Inducing aspect-experiences – the sudden seeing of something anew, as when a face suddenly strikes us as familiar – can be used as a philosophical method. In seeing aspects, I argue, we let ourselves experience what it would be like to conceptualize something in a particular way, apart from any conceptual routine. We can use that experience to examine our ways of conceptualizing things, and re-evaluate the ways we make sense of them. I claim that we are not always passive with regard to these experiences, and explain how we can actively induce them. I distinguish this method from other standard Wittgensteinian philosophical methods.

Author Biography

Reshef Agam-Segal, Virginia Military Institute

Reshef Agam-Segal is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the Virginia Military Institute. His main research interests include Wittgenstein, ethics, and philosophy and literature. Publications include: “A Splitting ‘Mind-Ache’: An Anscombean Challenge to Kantian Self-Legislation” (Journal of Philosophical Research, 2013); “How to Investigate the Grammar of Aspect-Perception: A Question in Wittgensteinian Method” (Essays in Philosophy, 2012); “Contours and Barriers: What Is It to Draw the Limits of Language?” (Philosophy, 2009).

References

Agam-Segal, R., 2012. “Reflecting on Language from “Sideways-on”: Preparatory and Non-Preparatory Aspects-Seeing”. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 1(6), pp. 0-17.

Agam-Segal, R., 2014. “When Language Gives Out: Conceptualization, and Aspect-Seeing as a Form of Judgment”. Metaphilosophy 45(1), pp. 41-68.

Baz, A., 2000. “What’s the Point of Seeing Aspects?”. Philosophical Investigations 23(2), pp. 97-121.

Baz, A., 2010 “On Learning from Wittgenstein, or What Does it Take to See the Grammar of Seeing Aspects?”. In: W. Day and V. J. Krebs eds. 2010. Seeing Wittgenstein Anew. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 227-48.

Baz, A., 2012. When Words Are Called For, Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Baz, A., (Forthcoming) “Aspects of Perception”. In Seeing Something in Something: Wollheim, Wittgenstein, and Pictorial Representation. Ed. Gary Kemp & Gabriele Mras, London: Routledge.

Carroll. L., 1895. “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles”. Mind 4(14), pp. 287-80.

Diamond. C., 1984. “Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology by Ludwig Wittgenstein”. Philosophical Review 93(3), pp. 458-62.

Diamond. C., 1989. “Rules: Looking in the Right Place”. In: D. Z. Phillips and P. Winch eds. 1989. Wittgenstein: Attention to Particulars: Essays in Honour of Rush Rhees. Macmillan: Basingstoke, pp. 12-34.

Diamond. C., 1996. “Wittgenstein, Mathematics, and Ethics: Resisting the Attractions of Realism”. In: H. Sluga, and D. Stern eds. 1996. The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 226-260.

Drury. M., 1973. “Madness and Religion,” In: The Danger of Words, New York: Humanities Press, pp. 115-37.

Fiser, K. 1986. “Privacy and Pain”. Philosophical Investigations 9(1), pp. 1–17.

Floyd. J., 2010. “On Being Surprised: Wittgenstein on Aspect-Perception, Logic, and Mathematics”. In: W. Day and V. J. Krebs, eds. 2010. Seeing Wittgenstein Anew. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 314-37.

Frege. G., 1960, The Foundations of Arithmetic, J. L. Austin trans. New York: Harper.

Hume. D., 1799. “Of Suicide”. In: Essays on Suicide and the Immortality of the Soul. London: Basil, pp. 1-14.

Kant. I., 1952. Critique of Judgment, J. C. Meredith trans. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kant. I., 1992. “Jäsche Logic”. In: J. M. Young ed., J. M. Young trans. Lectures on Logic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 527-629.

Kripke. S., 1982. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Oxford: Blackwell.

McDowell. J., 1981. “Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following”. In: S. Holtzman and C. M. Leich eds. 1981. Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule, London: Routledge, pp. 141-62.

McDowell. J., 1998. “Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?”. In: Mind, Value, and Reality, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, pp. 77-94.

Moran. R., 1989. “Seeing and Believing: Metaphor, Image, and Force”. Critical Inquiry 16(1), pp. 87-112.

Mulhall. S., 2001. Inheritance and Originality, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mulhall. S., 2004. “Philosophy’s Hidden Essence – PI 89-133”. In: E. Ammereller and E. Fischer eds. 2004. Wittgenstein at Work. London: Routledge, pp. 63-85.

Mulhall. S., 2010. “The Work of Wittgenstein’s Words: A Reply to Baz”. In: W. Day and V. J. Krebs eds. 2010. Seeing Wittgenstein Anew. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 249-67.

Plato., 1997. “Parmenides”. In: J. M. Cooper ed., M. L. Gill and P. Ryan trans. 1997. Plato Complete Works. Indianapolis: Hackett, pp. 359-97.

Wittgenstein, L., 1922. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. C. K. Ogden trans. London: Routledge.

Wittgenstein. L., 1958. Philosophical Investigations. 3rd ed. R. Rhees, and G. E. M. Anscombe eds. G. E. M. Anscombe trans. Oxford: Blackwell.

Wittgenstein. L., 1969. The Blue and Brown Books. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell.

Wittgenstein, L., 1978. Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. Rev. ed., G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees and G.E.M. Anscombe eds. G.E.M. Anscombe trans. Oxford: Blackwell.

Wittgenstein, L., 1980. Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. Vol. 1. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright eds. G. E. M. Anscombe trans. Oxford: Blackwell.

Wittgenstein, L., 1998. Culture and Value. G. H., von Wright, H. Nyman and A. Pichler eds. P. Winch trans. Oxford: Blackwell.

Wittgenstein, L., 2003. Ludwig Wittgenstein – Public and Private Occasions. J. C. Klagge and A. Nordmann eds. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Downloads

Published

2015-07-24

Issue

Vol. 4 No. 1 (2015): Volume 4 / Number 1 (Jul 2015), A.-M. Søndergaard Christensen, M. Gustafsson, Y. Neuman (eds.); A. Pichler (from the Archives)

Section

Articles

License

NWR uses the Creative Commons license CC-BY.

Vol. 1-3 used CC-BY-NC-SA. The collected works copyright ownership for Vol. 1-2 were shared by Nordic Wittgenstein Society and ontos Verlag/De Gruyter.